I. Introduction
Calls of in-the-money convertible securities are reexamined in light of a short-run liquidity cost explanation of observed price behavior. In the scenario described below the announcement of a conversion-forcing call heralds the beginning of a period of abnormally high sell-order volume in the calling firm's common stock. Market dealers respond to the order imbalances by lowering prices to deter sellers and attract buyers. Thus, observed negative stock price reactions to call announcements contain a transitory component reflecting the price of liquidity in the capital markets. The evidence we report is broadly consistent with predictions related to the liquidity explanation for stock price reactions to convertible bond calls and is partially consistent for calls of convertible preferred stocks.
The liquidity hypothesis presented below joins several other possible explanations for observed Firms' announcements to call in-the-money convertible securities for redemption essentially force their conversion into common stock, and such announcements are generally met with significant reductions in the calling firms' equity values. An explanation based on liquidity costs is advanced and tested. The explanation implies that investors who choose to sell their shares early in the conversion period bear liquidity costs by selling at reduced prices. Consistent with the explanation, the average share price decline is short-lived, lasting most of the conversion period. Thus, a component of the call announcement effect appears to be due to liquidity costs. negative stock price reactions to calls of in-the-money convertible bonds and preferred stocks (Mikkelson 1981 (Mikkelson , 1985 ; Mais, Moore, and Rogers 1989). Mikkelson (1985) finds evidence that lost interest tax shields due to calling convertible bonds account for at least some of the negative announcement effect. However, this explanation cannot extend to the negative effects of calls of convertible preferred stocks because preferred dividends do not provide tax shields. Information signaling is suggested as a theoretical explanation by Harris and Raviv (1985) for (1) the adverse stock price effects and (2) the reality that convertible bond calls are typically delayed until the convertibles are substantially in the money (Ingersoll 1977b ).1 Their model has found empirical support in the evidence reported by Ofer and Natarajan (1987) , though some of their most persuasive evidence is shown to be critically sensitive to the choice of estimation period for the returngenerating process used in their study (Cowan, Nayar, and Singh 1990) . Moreover, the predictions of the model set forth by Harris and Raviv (1985) do not extend in an obvious way to calls of convertible preferred stocks, though perhaps a signaling argument can be made that would explain the negative price effect observed for these securities as well.
Though no single explanation set forth so far has found general support across different types of security calls, negative stock price reactions to call announcements represent an empirical regularity that may be partially explained by short-run liquidity costs. A liquidity-based explanation of stock price behavior around calls of convertible bonds and preferred stocks is set forth in Section II. Evidence of negative equity valuation effects due to calls of both types of convertible securities is reported in Section III, and stock price behavior before and after the announcement period also is examined in that section. For our combined sample of 169 calls of convertible bonds and preferred stocks, we find a significant negative average abnormal return of about 1.9% for the 2-day announcement period, consistent with the negative effects documented by Mikkelson (1981) for convertible bond calls and by Mais, Moore, and Rogers (1989) for convertible preferred stock calls. For the period following announcement ending on the last day on 1. In perfect capital markets with zero call notice period, Ingersoll (1977a) and Brennan and Schwartz (1977, 1980) show that the optimal policy is to call when stock value just equals the effective call price, i.e., the stated call price plus accrued interest. An alternative explanation for delayed calls is set forth by Constantinides and Grundy (1987) . If calling is costly, the firm will rationally delay if voluntary conversion by the convertible security holders is anticipated. Jaffee and Shleifer (1990) offer another explanation for delayed calls based on avoidance of financial distress. Given a positive call notice period, the firm will rationally wait until a convertible security is well in the money to minimize the chance that it will be out of the money by the call date. If the security goes out of the money, the firm is faced with redeeming for cash a large security issue, and this may lead to financial distress. which conversion is possible, we find a significant positive cumulative average abnormal return of about 2.2%, suggesting that a component of the announcement effect is transitory. Tests of the liquidity-based explanation are reported in Section IV. We show that stock prices rebound significantly following announcements of convertible bond calls. That is, those stocks that decline the most upon announcement tend to regain the most during the period of conversion. No evidence of rebounding following calls of convertible preferred stocks is found. The combined findings are interpreted and summarized in Section V.
II. Liquidity Effects of Calls of Convertible Securities
Short-run liquidity costs may arise in "the form of an explicit commission or a price away from the equilibrium price" (Kraus and Stoll 1972, p. 571). Liquidity costs due to prices set away from equilibrium have been detected in the case of block trades by Kraus and Stoll (1972) , in new equity issues via general cash offers by Barclay and Litzenberger (1988) , and for equity issue via rights offers by Hansen (1988) . Liquidity costs in the form of explicit dealer compensation as measured by the bid-ask spread are detected for secondary equity distributions by Mikkelson and Partch (1985) . In hypothesizing the behavior of stock prices around convertible calls, we follow Kraus and Stoll (1972) , Mikkelson and Partch (1985) , and others in recognizing that increases in supply may lead to long-term price effects due to less than perfectly elastic demand, or short-term effects due to liquidity costs.
A conversion-forcing call in our scenario marks the beginning of a period of accelerated trading that is largely seller initiated.2 Rather than holding newly converted shares as permanent additions to their portfolios, holders of called convertibles may decide to liquidate the shares. The decision to liquidate may be based on differences in yields and capital gains potential between the convertibles and underlying shares, leading to changes in tax liability. If the investor is an institution such as a bank, there may be regulatory or policy requirements that dictate rebalancing of the portfolio after conversion. Because the market value of the convertible will be very close to its conversion value after the call announcement, the decision to convert, then sell the shares, or to sell the convertible security directly, will rest on relative brokerage fees and perhaps the relative speed with which the convertibles and the shares can be liquidated.
In response to an in-the-money call, market makers (specialists) adjust bid and ask prices to deter sellers and attract buyers. If sell orders 2. During the week of the call announcement, trading volume in our data set increases by an average of 44% for bond calls and 38% for preferred calls relative to average weekly volume before the announcement.
are not reduced sufficiently, or buy orders are not increased sufficiently by the price change, dealers must temporarily absorb some of the shares. For compensation for providing liquidity, a dealer should lower bid and ask quotes so that transaction prices are below the new long-run equilibrium.3 In this scenario, we are casting convertible security calls as "liquidity events" in the sense described by Grossman and Miller (1988) , and dealers' responses are consistent with various models of dealer markets under conditions of inventory risk (Garman 1976; Stoll 1978; Ho and Stoll 1981 ; and O'Hara and Oldfield 1986).
If forced conversion leads to portfolio-rebalancing behavior as we have described, the call announcement will be followed by a protracted period of high sell-order volume unless bid and ask quotes are kept low to deter sellers and attract buyers. We do not know how many trades are due to rebalancing, and we cannot pin down when such trading takes place in the aftermath of a forced conversion. But the scenario is rich enough to allow us to predict that investors who sell early in the process will do so at lower prices than those willing to wait. Thus, call announcements should result in immediate stock price reductions below long-run equilibrium, and prices will begin to recover thereafter, continuing until the demand for immediacy by sellers is diminished.
This scenario brings us to view a conversion-forcing call as similar to issuance of new common stock via a rights offering in which current shareholders receive the right to purchase additional shares, usually at a discount. When the rights are exercised the shareholders will then have more shares in their portfolios, and they may wish to sell some in order to rebalance. The effect is a price decline during a temporary period of selling, and a price recovery therafter. The price decline is to entice buyers to provide immediacy to sellers, and the loss in portfolio value suffered by the sellers (original shareholders) represents an additional cost of marketing the shares. This is the scenario presented by Hansen (1988) , and it appears to go far in resolving a long-standing paradox in finance.4 Under the scenario presented above, a conversion-forcing call also passes some of the task of marketing newly issued common shares to security holders, in this case, convertible bondholders and preferred stockholders.
All of the convertible securities examined in this study are issued 3. The quoted spread is the set of bid and ask prices quoted by the specialist and represents the realized spread only if the specialist could execute a buy and a sell order simultaneously. The realized spread (Stoll 1989 by firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange or, in a few cases, the American Stock Exchange. These exchanges feature continuous auction markets with single dealers (specialists) appointed to maintain liquid markets for specified securities. The liquidity-based explanation for stock price behavior around calls of convertibles predicts a decline in stock price upon announcement. This is the same prediction, at least for convertible bonds, that arises from the asymmetric information model of Harris and Raviv (1985) and the lost tax shield explanation supported by Mikkelson (1985) . Thus, the liquidity explanation is not set forth as an exclusive alternative to other explanations. It supplements these in suggesting that a component of the announcement period price reaction will be transitory, while not ruling out a permanent price change as well.
III. Stock Price Behavior Surrounding Security Calls

A. Sample Selection
The preliminary sample of calls of convertible bonds was identified in annual editions of Moody's Industrial Manual. Redemptions of preferred stocks are not identified in Moody's, thus the preliminary sample was identified by first isolating firms that had convertible preferred stock outstanding according to Standard and Poor's Compustat data base. Firms that reduced the amount of outstanding convertible preferred during a given year were selected as candidates.
The preliminary samples were subjected to the screening criteria enumerated below; the final samples consist of 111 convertible bond calls and 58 convertible preferred calls:5 1. The calling firm's daily rates of return on common stock surrounding the redemption date must be available on the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) Daily Returns File. This requirement effectively limits the sample to only those firms that have their common stock listed on either the New York or American stock exchange. In addition, each conmmon stock is required to have at least 100 daily returns recorded in the CRSP file during each of the estimation periods described in the next section. 2. An unambiguous first public announcement of the call decision appeared in the Wall Street Journal, and the announcement was the only firm-specific news item on that date, or at any time during the period from 2 days before to 2 days after that date.
5. Though the sample selection criteria differ slightly, this should not pose a problem for inferences drawn from the analysis. The tests are performed on the combined sample and on each subsample independently. In table 1, descriptive statistics are presented for the two samples. The calls of convertible bonds and preferred stocks represent relatively large increases in common shares outstanding upon conversion. The average ratio of the actual number of shares issued due to conversion to the number of shares outstanding before conversion is 13.2% for the bonds and 12.8% for the preferred stocks. These average values are close to the ratios reported by Mikkelson and Partch (1986) and Asquith and Mullins (1986) for new issues of common equity.
The length of time between public announcement and the end of the conversion period averages 27.5 trading days for bonds and 26.5 trading days for preferred stocks. The length of time varies from 16 to 60 trading days for bonds and from 14 to 56 days for preferred stocks; thus there is substantial variability in the notice periods stipulated by the call provisions.
B. Measurement of Abnormal Returns
We measure abnormal returns and assess statistical significance of various cross-sectional averages of those returns using the market model primarily and supplement the analysis with the mean-adjusted returns model estimated over identical estimation periods. The abnormal return (ARi) based on the market model for security j during period t is given by equation ( In table 2, panels A and B, results for the combined sample are presented in column 1, the convertible bonds in column 2, and the convertible preferred stocks in column 3. Price behavior before the announcement date (AD) during the period AD-60 to AD-2 is similar for the combined sample, the bonds only, and the preferred stocks only, regardless of the choice of estimation period. In all cases, there is a statistically significant positive CAAR, ranging from .047 (Z = 3.319) for bonds only, using before-event estimation, to .094 (Z = 4.387) for preferred stocks only, using after-event estimation. For the full sample, using after-event estimation, 119 observations have positive cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) compared to 50 with negative CARs.7 The preannouncement run-up reaffirms that documented by Mikkelson (1981) .
6. Since the same point estimates of the market model parameters are used to calculate all of the elements of the time series of abnormal returns for a given security, the independence of AR,, and ARjs, s $z t, may not hold. The abnormal return series for each security was tested for first-order autocorrelation, and in only six cases out of the combined sample of 169 securities was the correlation estimate significant at the 5% level.
7. The probability of drawing at least 119 positive CARs in a sample of 169 given that positive and negative CARs are equally probable is less than .001. The 2-day announcement-period results are also consistent across samples and for both estimation periods. For the combined sample using before-event estimation (table 2, Stock price behavior during the conversion period is described visually by graphing CAAR values beginning the day following announcement (AD +1) and extending to AD + 30, approximating the average interval from announcement to the end of conversion. This is done in figure 1, panels a and in table 2 were repeated using the mean-adjusted returns model. The results were parallel to those reported in table 2 for the combined, convertible bond, and preferred stock samples for both the after-event and before-event estimation periods. Thus, the sensitivity of the results is confined to the choice of estimation period, and not to the choice of return generating models.
Previous studies of convertible security calls that report abnormal stock returns immediately subsequent to announcement vary as to their conclusions. Mikkelson's (1981) data reveal positive cumulative raw returns of .88% during the 30-day period following convertible bond calls, and 1.05% for the same period following convertible preferred calls. Campbell, Ederington, and Vankudre (1991) report cumulative average abnormal returns of 1.939% for the 40-day period following convertible bond calls using after-event estimation of the market model. With before-event estimation they find a cumulative average abnormal return of -1.10%. Singh, Cowan, and Nayar (1991), using after-event estimation of the market model, find a cumulative average abnormal return of 3.62% for the 60-day period following nonunder- To the extent that the negative price reaction on the announcement date is due at least partially to selling pressure, a rebound should be in evidence; that is, prices that decline the most should recover the most. To examine this we follow Hansen (1988) . This suggests that a 1.0% abnormal decline in price upon announcement is followed by a recovery of about .6%. We interpret these findings as convincing support for the liquidity hypothesis; that is, stock prices that decline the most 10. Ofer and Natarajan (1987) report significant negative price performance for the year following convertible bond calls, consistent with the signaling theory of Harris and Raviv (1985) . We replicated their analysis using the sample described in their article, and, using before-event estimation as they did, we find the CAAR for months + 1 through + 12 to be -.101 (Z = -3.307), consistent with their findings. Using after-event estimation we find a CAAR of .032 (Z = .401). Thus, the evidence in support of negative signaling vanishes when after-event estimation is used. See Cowan, Nayar, and Singh (1990) for a more elaborate test that establishes the same finding.
11. We use the date conversion ends as the last inclusive date for the recovery period because it is precisely identifiable. Ideally, we would use the last day on which liquidation of new shares ends, and this likely occurs after the conversion period ends. This date is not observable; however, we repeated the analysis using arbitrarily chosen terminal dates CED + 5 and CED + 20. The point estimates of the CAAR values remain approximately the same. because of convertible bond calls recover the most by the time conversion ends.
The results for the preferred stock sample are not consistent with the liquidity hypothesis. For example, using mixed estimation period parameters we find I = .599 with a t-statistic of 1.194. The sign is opposite of that predicted.
Since CARj, + lEND is measured over a considerable amount of time for the preferred stock calls (average 26.5 days) and the bond calls (average 27.5 days), the price rebound tests may be distorted by firmspecific developments that occur during the notice period. Removal of observations having other Wall Street Journal announcements during the notice period results in a severe reduction in sample size, particularly in the case of preferred stock calls. Thus, we report two additional tests using the full samples that may be less subject to distortion by extreme observations. The first employs Kendall's test of concordance between CARj, -1,0 and CARJ + 1,END. The results are similar to those in table 3. For the bond sample (N = 111), Kendall's "tau" statistic is -.167 using after-event estimation, significantly different from zero at the 10% level using a two-tailed test. For the preferred stock sample (N = 58), the statistic is .117 for after-event estimation and is not significantly different from zero at the 10% level using a two-tailed test.
The final test involves ranking the announcement-period abnormal returns (CARj, -O) and grouping the conversion-period abnormal returns (CARj, +?lEND) according to quartiles of the distributions of 
V. Summary and Conclusions
Calls of in-the-money convertible securities are voluntary steps taken by managers, which have been shown to cause negative common share price reactions upon announcement. We have argued that the observed stock price response may be explained in part by a liquidity cost argument similar to that made by Hansen (1988) in the case of rights offers. Hansen argues that rights offers leave current shareholders with portfolio imbalances that appear to be corrected by selling the new shares. Concentrated selling pressure forces a temporary price decline, and this represents an additional cost of marketing new shares. Thus, it is not clear that rights offerings are truly less costly than general cash offers; therefore managerial behavior cannot be judged to be irrational. We have made a similar argument in the case of convertible security calls, and our argument supplements others such as that made by Harris and Raviv (1985). The evidence is for the most part consistent for calls of convertible bonds and partially consistent for preferred stock calls. Calls of both types of securities result in significant negative announcement effects, regardless of the choice of estimation period.
Using an after-event estimation period for market model parameters, we find significant positive cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) during the conversion period for the combined sample as well as the bonds and preferred stocks separately. Using before-event estimation, which, it has been argued, may be biased, the CAARs during the conversion period are positive but not statistically significant.
For the sample of convertible bond calls, stock prices are found to rebound during the conversion period. But the rebound test fails in the convertible preferred stock sample, regardless of the choice of estimation period.
For convertible bond calls the weight of the evidence supports the liquidity-based explanation we have set forth. While these findings cannot rule out other explanations advanced and supported in previous research, they are clearly consistent with predictions of the liquiditybased explanation, which do not arise in the other explanations. The evidence on calls of convertible preferred stocks is mixed, thus our findings are not judged fully conclusive for these types of securities.
